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I. Introduction: The Line of Argumentation 
A main source of legitimacy in investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) is associated with the 
interpretative authority of arbitral tribunals. This authority is substantially based on the 
reductionist assumption that coherence in treaty interpretations instigates an authoritative 
body of law by signalling predictability and systemic unity. From a structural perspective, 
arbitral authorisation can thus be essentially understood as a legitimation practice based on a 
tribunal’s ‘correct’ performance of legal reasoning. Yet views over what may be the ‘correct’ 
path of reasoning are divided. Current scholarship on the topic is generally understood as 
tending to portray legitimate arbitral authority as either stemming from a rigorous exercise of 
procedural autonomy with regard to the factual peculiarities of the case at hand1 or as 
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residing in the attempt of approximating a jurisprudence constante.2 Assessments of the 
legitimacy of arbitrators’ conduct and performance may therefore be seen to be based upon 
either internal or external criteria: i.e. on the one hand, the emphasis on arbitral autonomy as 
adhering to procedural coherence and context dependence (internal) or, on the other hand, the 
prominence given to investment treaty arbitration’s instrumental role in approximating a 
jurisprudential congruity within the existent body of preceding awards (external).  
In the following it will be argued that perceiving these two seemingly conflicting 
perspectives as correlative and co-original determinants can substantially aid in ongoing 
endeavours of conceptualising investment treaty arbitration’s uniqueness as a dispute 
settlement mechanism which amalgamates horizontal treaty authorisation with legitimate 
arbitral authority. Against this background of a shift of perspective this article makes the 
claim that the authorisation of arbitral tribunals should be understood as an essentially 
representational rather than causal interrelation between arbitral performance and 
authoritative ruling, on the one hand, and responsiveness to procedural autonomy and 
accountability to implications of public concern on the other. Making the case for a balanced 
view on the autonomous and instrumental aspects of investment treaty arbitration, the article 
demonstrates the need for incorporating political interests into the reasoning of tribunals, not 
as causal necessities but as representational determinants.  
II. Legitimacy As Arbitration’s Ethics 
Legitimacy concerns regarding the interpretative authority of arbitral tribunals are of an 
essentially ethical nature and concerned with internal and external perceptions of legitimacy.3 
The scholarly focus on arbitrators’ conduct where legitimacy relies on the ‘constant vigilance 
and active engagement of judges, arbitrators and lawyers alike’4 and where appointments of 
arbitrators depend on a ‘reputation for impartial and independent judgment’5 is closely related 
                                                                                                                                                        
Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, ‘The Future of International Investment Law – Substantive Protection and Dispute 
Settlement’ in Marc Bungenberg, Jörn Griebel, Stephan Hobe and August Reinisch (eds), International 
Investment Law (Nomos 2015) 1863, 1868. 
2   See e.g. Andrea K Bjorklund, ‘The Promise and Peril of Arbitral Precedents: The Case of Amici 
Curiae’ (2010) 34 Association Suisse de l’Arbitrage 165, 165; Christoph Schreuer, ‘The Future of 
Investment Arbitration’ in Mahnoush H Arsanjani, Jacob Katz Cogan, Robert D Sloane and Siegfried 
Wiessner (eds), Looking to the Future: Essays in Honor of W. Michael Reisman (Nijhoff 2011) 787, 802; 
Charles Brower and Stephan W Schill, ‘Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International 
Investment Law?’ (2009) 9 (2) Chicago J Intl L 471, 474; or, very recently, Marc Bungenberg and Catherine 
Titi, ‘Precedents in International Investment Law’ in Marc Bungenberg, Jörn Griebel, Stephan Hobe and 
August Reinisch (eds), International Investment Law (Nomos 2015) 1505, 1508–10. 
3   Jan Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration (OUP 2013) 147. 
4   Charles N Brower, ‘A Crisis of Legitimacy’ (2002) 7 October National LJ 1–3, 3. 
5   Brower and Schill (n 2) 491. 
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to what Charles Brower and Stephan W. Schill have called ‘the self-understanding … of 
those who decide disputes on the international level’.6 Capturing this dynamic orbiting 
legitimacy concerns, David D. Caron has proposed to view the distinction between individual 
arbitration that takes place in a particular setting as opposed to arbitration seen as ‘the 
aggregate result of numerous arbitrations’7 as a purposeful as well as productive interaction. 
He has suggested that the evocation of legitimacy concerns in individual arbitrations may be 
understood as forceful rhetorical ‘argument of last resort pointing to possible systemic 
implications’.8  
Even though ethical perspectives on arbitration may suggest to be of a mere advisory nature, I 
claim that neither of the two sides in the relation between the arbitrating arbitrator 
(individual arbitration) and the arbitrator performing arbitration (arbitration as an 
adjudicative system) should be isolated. As both perspectives directly concern legitimacy, 
individual arbitration and arbitration as a system conceptually rely upon and necessitate each 
other. This has to do with the distinct structure of ISDS itself, the ‘considerable importance’, 
as Stephan W. Schill and Benedict Kingsbury confirm, which the role of legal reasoning 
carries for the legitimacy of the tribunals,9 and especially the position which arbitrators find 
themselves in when deciding matters of jurisdiction. Thomas Wälde, for example and with 
respect to local remedies, has rightly noted that ‘international investment tribunals have a 
heightened responsibility to deal with risks to the integrity of the arbitral process themselves 
as they cannot offload such responsibility onto others.’10 In general, this heightened 
responsibility which sharply distinguishes arbitral tribunals from any litigation procedures11 
stems from a type of arbitral reasoning which structurally prevents the impression of factual 
context on the tribunal’s decision about its own jurisdiction. Such particular burden of the 
arbitrators’ responsibility to oversee their own conduct essentially arises, as Wälde has 
phrased it ex negativo, out of the inherently self-referential process of arbitral review. 
                                                 
6   Ibid 471. Christoph Schreuer speaks of ‘attitudes of arbitrators towards the goal of their performance’ 
(Schreuer (n 2) 802). 
7   David D. Caron, ‘Investor State Arbitration: Strategic and Tactical Perspectives on Legitimacy’ (2008–
2009) 32 Suffolk Transnatl LR 513, 521. 
8   Ibid. 
9   Stephan W Schill and Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Investor–State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and 
Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law’ (2009) 6 Intl Law and 
Justice Working Paper, Global Administrative Law Series, New York, 45. 
10   Thomas Wälde, ‘Procedural Challenges in Investment Arbitration under the Shadow of the Dual Role 
of the State: Asymmetrics and Tribunals’ Duty to Ensure, Pro–actively, the Equality of Arms’ (2010) 26 (1) 
Arbitration International 3, 41. 
11   Compare also with Charles T. Kotuby Jr. and Luke A. Sobota, ‘Practical Suggestions to Promote the 
Legitimacy and Vitality of International Investment Arbitration’ (2013) 28 (2) ICSID R – Foreign 
Investment LJ 454, 455. 
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However, this very absence of hierarchically structured review mechanisms upon which 
tribunals could rely also renders the exceptional autonomy of arbitral tribunals a fact. In other 
words, in deciding upon jurisdictional authority, it is the notion of arbitral autonomy itself 
that requires clarification, as it crucially informs an understanding of arbitral authority as 
such.  
Furthermore, the manner in which a tribunals conduct legal reasoning is key in determining a 
legitimating proximity to such an arbitral ideal of autonomous procedure. In addressing 
matters of interpretation, arbitral reasoning, the composition of tribunals and congruity of 
arbitral awards the literature has identified problematic conditions for legitimate and 
legitimating arbitral reasoning not so much in the substantiality of awards issued. What Caron 
pinpointed as a ‘significant error reason requirement’12 is closely related to the ethical 
dimension underlying the legitimacy of interpretative authority. It qualifies the structure of 
self-reference to be an ex ante evaluative standard that merely and exclusively associates 
legitimacy concerns with procedural incoherence in the arbitral awards’ coming into 
existence, i.e. with the performance of arbitrators in relation to adhering to formal rules of 
procedure and legal reasoning. It will thus be shown in what follows that leaving the 
evaluation of individual arbitral performances aside has a distinct effect on scholarly attempts 
to assess a tribunal’s interpretative authority against the measure of coherence between treaty 
provision and arbitral authority itself. 
III. Coherence Of Arbitral Interpretation (And Reasoning)  
With ISDS legitimacy concerns ultimately pointing towards the systemic whole of 
investment treaty adjudication, understood as a coherent system of rules to decide 
consistently upon disputes, the logical point of analytical departure is the jurisprudential 
formation of rules governing international investment itself. Caron has rightly remarked that 
the scholarly concern with systemic coherence implies the closet ‘assertion that the 
jurisprudence of the system is incoherent’.13 Yet, the hidden presupposition behind this 
assertion, it is argued, is the basic idea that coherent causes will lead to coherent effects. 
Therefore, any critique of the incoherence of arbitral awards and international investment 
                                                 
12   Caron (n 7) 517. 
13   Caron (n 7) 516. Compare also with M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (CUP 
2010), 85. 
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rules relates intrinsically towards unified standards of interpretation and forms of reasoning 
during arbitral proceedings and in arbitral awards.14 
Legitimacy concerns may be grounded in the indeterminacy of standards of a particular 
investment treaty15 and due to cultural idiosyncrasies and differing political preferences, 
international treaties consented to by States posit a variety of standards as well as a different 
phrasing of similar standards to begin with.16 Moreover, given that State interests and 
political ideologies may change with the passing of time, even the international agreements 
consented to by one and the same State entity can encompass a similar amount of diversity of 
standards and formulations. If the initial interest in treaty formations changes, the subsequent 
treaty negotiations and formations change too.17  
However, the ensuing challenge for ISDS tribunals to interpretively determine standards 
coherently does not ipso facto condition concerns of legitimacy. It would be more than a 
Herculean task to coherently interpret and thereby unify the manifestations of such 
perpetually changing State interests. On the contrary, scholars do not tend to identify – as 
they indeed might – the threat to legitimacy in the inability of arbitrators to unify this treaty 
web of ephemeral standard provisions. Rather, they see grounds for legitimacy concerns in an 
interpretative activity of tribunals that produces even more varieties of interpretations and 
thus adds to the already vast amount of different standards and to what has been rightly 
identified and discussed as a phenomenon of a ‘fragmentation of authority’18. A limitation of 
                                                 
14   Compare with Federico Ortino, ‘Legal Reasoning of International Investment Tribunals: A Typology 
of Egregious Failures’ (2012) 3 (1) J Intl Dispute Settlement 31–52. 
15   Compare e.g. Charles H. Brower II, ‘Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter’ (2003) 
36 Vand J Transntl L 1536 and Charles N. Brower, Charles H. Brower II, and Jeremy K. Sharpe, ‘The 
Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication System’ (2003) 19 Arb Intl, 415. 
16   As a source of further diversity of substantial treaty obligations, the fair and equitable treatment 
standard, for example, appears in a variety of shapes, from an unqualified formulation (4 April 2009 China-
Switzerland BIT) over attachments to international law and customary international law (Art. 2(3)(a) 1999 
Bahrain-US BIT and Art. 1105(1), NAFTA) to additions of substantive content (Art. 4(3), 2009 Mexico-
Singapore BIT). Cp. UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment (United Nations 2012).  
17   This firm contextualist approach in understanding even legal relations and principles in international 
affairs had puzzled even Hersch Lauterpacht, especially in relation to the central principle of international 
treaty law, i.e. pacta sunt servanda, and particularly its exception, the clausula rebus sic stantibus. For 
Lauterpacht, the latter exception to the rule was a perplexing yet merely legal expression of political factors 
in treaty negotiation and formation (H Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community 
(Hamden Connecticut: Archion Books 1966), 279). Adding that the latter doctrine certainly violates the 
pacta sunt servanda principle, which is no less than “‘one of the bases of the legal relations between the 
members of any community”’ he eventually argued for conceiving the exception as an integral part of 
international law because such a possible voidability of contracts is “‘common to all systems of 
jurisprudence”’(ibid., 281). 
18   Cp. T Broude, Fragmentation(s) of International Law: On Normative Integration as Authority 
Integration’ (2008), The Shifting of Allocation of Authority in International Law, Tomer Broude and Yuval 
Shany (eds.), Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 99, and N Matz-Lück, ‘Structural Questions of Fragmentation’ 
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the interpretative scope of arbitral reasoning to only submitted facts of the case at hand would 
at least impede an increase in the uncertainty of textual meaning. However, such a limitation 
of the interpretative scope of ISDS tribunals is simply absent, and arbitral practice instead 
shows a tendency of an increasing interpretational latitude towards the applicable law.  
It is exactly these growing ‘expansionary interpretations’ of tribunals, Muthucumaraswamy 
Sornarajah explains, that pose a threat to the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole 
because they ‘extend the law in a manner not contemplated by the original drafting of the 
parties’.19 In this way, expansionary interpretations may be seen to fundamentally undermine 
the system of consent underlying international investment rules in general. The literature has 
dealt with this subject matter under the broad heading of legitimate expectations of sovereign 
entities and investors. What the latter may expect from investment treaty arbitration is the 
coherence of arbitral reasoning itself. Evoking an international rule of law as a cornerstone of 
legitimate interpretation as sufficient reason for legitimacy, Susan D. Franck has observed 
that:  
Without the clarity and consistency of both the rules of law and their application, 
there is a detrimental impact upon those governed by the rules and their willingness 
and ability to adhere to such rules, which can lead to a crisis of legitimacy. 
Legitimacy depends in large part upon factors such as determinacy and coherence, 
which can in turn beget predictability and reliability.20 
Against the background of the above-introduced perspective on the ethical nature of 
legitimacy concerns regarding interpretative authority, it is noteworthy that arbitrators’ self-
understanding is strongly supportive of the idea that arbitral autonomy resides in restrictive 
procedural self-governance. In his empirical study on the usage of interpretative arguments in 
98 decisions in 72 cases under the auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), Ole Kristian Fauchald considered the question whether 
tribunals created a ‘predictable legal framework’ and came to the conclusion that ‘the 
tendency to be “dispute oriented”, indicates that ICSID tribunals have significant potential to 
increase their ability to take into account interests other than those represented to them by 
investors and host countries.’21 For Fauchald, the legal reasoning of a tribunal is ‘dispute 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2012), ASIL Proceedings, vol. 105, p. 125.  
19   M. Sornarajah, ‘A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2008), 
Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes, Karl P. Sauvant (ed.), Oxford: OUP, pp. 39–45, 
41. 
20   Susan D. Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham LR 1528, 1584. 
21   Ole Kristian Fauchald, ‘The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals: An Empirical Analysis’ (2008) 19 
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oriented’ whenever the tribunal ‘restricts its arguments to those presented by the parties to the 
dispute’, as opposed to a tribunal which is ‘legislator-oriented’ in ‘isolating the interpretive 
issues and dealing with these independently of the facts of the case’.22 In the tendency of 
ICSID to take a restrictive approach to interpretation, Fauchald sees a ‘significant potential’ 
for ICSID arbitrations to include submissions from others, such as third parties. Yet, it is 
precisely this inclusion which, in turn, might encourage an expansionary method of 
interpretation, as criticised by Sornarajah. Rather, what Fauchald’s empirical study illustrates 
is the effect of legitimacy concerns of an ethical nature on the self-understanding of 
arbitrators. The conceptual implication of arbitral autonomy must thus be read to stand for an 
arbitral self-restriction. However, the question then arises of how arbitral autonomy relates to 
interpretative authority if the latter is evaluated against the level of coherence of its decisions. 
The ‘interpretative determinacy’ of treaty standards called for by Franck is not the result of a 
coherent arbitral reasoning itself. Providing a ‘clarification on the meaning and application of 
rules’ for arbitral tribunals, she insists, ‘can rectify textual indeterminacy’ of treaty provision, 
but the success, Franck admits, ‘depends upon who does the interpretation, their authority to 
interpret, and the coherence of the decisions they reach’.23 Regarding the composition of 
tribunals, it is important to add that legitimacy concerns not only arise through the varying 
interpretative methods of different arbitrators but also through different interpretative 
strategies and argumentative leanings adopted by any one arbitrator when partaking in 
different proceedings.24 This might also be seen to exemplify Brower and Schill’s 
legitimating notion of the ‘arbitrator’s reputation for impartial and independent judgment’ 
and to support their insistence that ‘arbitrator appointments in investment-treaty cases do not 
hinge primarily on the arbitrator’s position on the substantive issues in dispute in a specific 
case’.25 A fundamental critique of this arbitral reputation of neutrality has been formulated by 
Jan Paulsson in his comment on the 2003 ICSID award of Loewen v United States of 
America.26 In this case, as it later emerged, the arbitrator of the respondent State was put 
under severe pressure by officials of the U.S. Department of Justice prior to his appointment. 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2) Eur J Intl L 301, 359. 
22   Ibid 307. 
23   Franck (n 20) 1585. 
24   For a discussion of legitimacy concerns regarding arbitral personnel and conflicting interests and 
divergent interpretative methods, see Sornarajah (n 13) 462, footnote 34. 
25   Brower and Schill (n 2) 491, emphasis added. This finding was also confirmed in a representative 
empirical study on the professional background of arbitrators. See T Schultz and R Kovacs, ‘The Rise of a 
Third Generation of Arbitrators? Fifteen Years After Dezalay and Garth’ (2012) Arbitration Intl 28 (2), 161. 
26   Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)98/3, Award (26 June 2003). 
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In his commentary on the case, which eventually saw an unexpected outcome in favour of the 
respondent due to a technicality concerning ‘continuous nationality’, Paulsson emphatically 
states:  
[The] practice of unilateral appointments militates against coherently and sincerely 
motivated awards. Since the requirement of reasons is intended to serve as a check on 
arbitrariness, it follows that the subversion of this requirement carries the risk that 
awards fail to fulfil their important legitimating function.27 
For Paulsson, the problems inherent to the parties’ appointment of their respective arbitrators 
are central to the incoherence of reasoning itself, leading him to the rather pessimistic 
conclusion that ‘only a few arbitral institutions can make credible claims to legitimacy’28 
while the practice of unilateral appointment seems unlikely to change. 
Questions of arbitral personnel, their responsiveness to influence and the composition of 
tribunals remain structurally embedded in the context of interpretational coherence as well as 
determined by the above mentioned pre-conception of a direct correlation between coherent 
causes and coherent effects. The centre of attention of concern about legitimacy of scholars 
seems to oscillate between critiquing arbitrators’ autonomous choice of interpretative 
methods and the self-restrictive approach taken, as indicative in the ICSID review mechanism 
stipulated by ICSID Convention’s Article 52 and its minimalistic ‘reason requirement’. 
However, an ethics perspective on these two aspects reveals that the self-restrictive 
interpretation essentially stems from arbitral autonomy, and thus might approximate a 
legitimating coherence of performance through procedural self-governance. In other words, 
given the autopoietic and self-referential rhetorics of arbitral tribunals with regard to 
jurisdiction, applicable law and its expansive or non-expansive interpretation, a coherent 
performative pattern appears more likely because the autonomous as well as treaty-dependent 
subject of arbitral performance happens to be the one and the same arbitral tribunal. 
However, the identified elements of arbitrators’ reputation and their performative coherence 
during proceedings are only partly affected by such autonomous arbitral self-understanding. 
In other words, if interpretational coherence is the effective cause of a legitimate arbitral 
performance, its final cause, i.e. reliability of performance and predictability of outcomes, 
points towards the issuing of arbitral awards themselves as the manifestation of arbitral 
reasoning and interpretation. 
                                                 
27   Jan Paulsson, ‘Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution’ (2010) 25 (2) ICSID R – Foreign 
Investment L J, 339, 353. 
28   Ibid 354. 
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IV. Coherence Of Arbitral Awards 
Once an arbitral award is issued, its reasoning and interpretational findings relate to other 
awards in an affirmative or dissenting manner. It thereby partakes in and (through the 
uniqueness of the facts and legal issues it accommodates) adds to a dynamic body of arbitral 
jurisprudence in its distinct way. However, the uniqueness of an arbitral award not only stems 
from the idiosyncratic composition of its parties, facts, legal ground of claims and other 
contextual determinants. It also derives from the form of its coming into existence – the 
procedural determinants peculiar to investment treaty arbitration. In analysing the particular 
and institutionally predetermined function that arbitrators bring to bear, Charles T. Kotuby 
and Luke A. Sobota have rightly emphasised that ‘because final awards must be accepted as 
just by a broad constituency of interested parties, the strength of the institution of investor-
State arbitration is in many ways measured by the strength of its awards’.29 This essentially 
retrospective causal relation between the ‘strength of the award’, i.e. the reasoning and 
interpretative methods offered therein, and the performance of crafting an award, not only 
affirms the above introduced ethical stand on legitimacy concerns regarding interpretative 
authority but also serves as the underlying justificatory moment for, as Kotuby and Sobota 
explain, perceiving ‘shortcomings in final awards’ as ‘anterior problems in the arbitration 
process’.30  
In this way, incongruities in the composition of awards and possible contradictory relations to 
other arbitral rulings do not concern the legitimacy of arbitral jurisprudence on international 
investments per se. While the emphasis is put on the performance of arbitrators in general, 
and particularly on the ‘coherent’ form in which an award is crafted in terms of interpretative 
methods and reasoning, the external recognition of an award (approvingly or disapprovingly) 
also finds its origin in the arbitral proceedings. Legitimacy concerns about incoherent awards 
can therefore be said to condition the incoherence of arbitral reasoning. The retrospective 
transformation of problems stemming from contradicting awards into questions of tribunals’ 
interpretative authority is not a mere theoretical concern. In the case of Lauder/CME v Czech 
Republic31 – which has become the locus classicus of legitimacy concerns through the 
                                                 
29   Kotuby and Sobota (n 11) 456. 
30   Kotuby and Sobota (n 11) 456. 
31   Ronald S. Lauder v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration Proceedings, Award (3 September 2001) 
and CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Proceedings, Award (14 March 2003). 
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respondent winning and losing cases on effectively identical grounds before two different 
arbitral tribunals – it was the later Stockholm tribunal’s manner of emphasising its autonomy 
against the earlier London tribunal which eventually resulted in what Brower called a ‘totally 
conflicting [arbitral decision]’.32 The Stockholm tribunal acknowledged that ‘[b]oth 
arbitrations deal with [the] same investment in the Czech Republic’ but were mindful of 
refraining from ‘judg[ing] whether the facts submitted to the two tribunals for decision are 
identical.’33 This rhetorical distinction – bearing the hidden preconception that facts 
submitted for decision to any two tribunals are never identical – manifestly served the one 
purpose of autonomously generating arbitral authority, i.e. jurisdiction. In distinguishing 
between the sameness and identity of submitted facts, the Stockholm tribunal in CME v 
Czech Republic stressed the non-contextuality34 of its interpretative authority, thereby 
effectively excluding the reasoning and findings of other tribunals.  
In the context of the measures of arbitral coherence and external recognition of arbitral 
awards as introduced above, the Lauder/CME cases thus signal a non-consequentialist 
attitude written into arbitral reasoning. This attitude finds expression in the prima facie 
prioritisation of procedural performance over the delivery and possible effects of awards.35 
This also applies reciprocally with regard to the moment of external recognition. In awards 
which are incoherent with the existing body of arbitral decisions, it is generally not the award 
itself which becomes the focus of illegitimacy concerns but rather the arbitral proceedings 
themselves. 
This predicament between the internal and the external side of investment treaty arbitration, 
between arbitral performance and arbitral award, is strongly connected to the question of 
coherence itself because it touches upon the nature of the institution of arbitration itself. If 
coherence, as Franck writes, ‘begets predictability and reliability’,36 the nature of the 
assumed causal relation generates a twofold perspective towards the receiving end of those 
legitimate expectations, as the latter apply internally as well as externally. Firstly, legitimate 
                                                 
32   Brower (n 4) 2. 
33   CME v Czech Republic (n 30) para 432. 
34   For a territorial reading and conception of non-contextuality as delocalisation see Jan Paulsson, ‘The 
extend of independence of international arbitration from the law of the situs’ in Julian D M Lew, 
Contemporary Problems of International Arbitration (Nijhoff 1987) 141. 
35    For a study on the legitimating function of such a non-consequentialism see David D. Caron, ‘The 
Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council’ (1993) 87 Am J Intl L 552, 561: ‘[I]n some 
instances integrity is promoted by entrusting operation of the organization to persons who can claim to be 
independent of those governed and to have no interest in a particular outcome.’ 
36   Franck (n 20) 1584. 
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expectations can be perceived to determine the (self-governing) interpretative autonomy of 
arbitrators, i.e. their above-mentioned self-understanding of ethical conduct. Secondly, 
legitimate expectations promote external acceptance by investors37 as well as recognition by 
State entities as the disputing parties and recipients of final awards. What is repeatedly 
mirrored in this distinction – and to be addressed in the following – is the question of whether 
the legitimate authority of the institution of arbitration resides in autonomous procedural 
performances or if a tribunal is ‘authorised’ to arbitrate on the basis of an arbitration 
provision contained in the respective investment treaties.  
 
V. Coherence Of Arbitral Authority And Treaty Authorisation  
As has been stressed above, the critical focus on arbitral performance in the scholarly 
literature on legitimacy is based on the assumption of a causal link between coherent arbitral 
reasoning and the expectation of a predictable and reliable outcome for the parties involved. 
Arbitral conduct is internally determined through arbitrators’ autonomy while party 
expectations in arbitral proceedings represent an external determinant in playing a crucial role 
in the recognition of proceedings through the recognition of awards. Serving these two types 
of expectation, i.e. the self-imposed internal and the retrospective external, is the principal 
task in which arbitrators engage once the tribunal is formed. The interpretation of the role 
which arbitrators perform (authority) or ought to performatively represent disputants’ interest 
(authorisation) falls upon the ethical stand, i.e. upon the concrete understanding that 
arbitrators have of their sources of authority. The identification of the source of authority, in 
turn, is not only conditioned by the self-understanding of arbitrators but also conditions the 
arbitral performance in that it provides as well as restricts the particular tools of legal 
reasoning. The self-understanding of arbitrators thus critically affects the arbitral award in 
two ways: firstly, relating arbitral performance to a particular arbitral self-understanding 
determines the scope of interpretative authority as well as the instruments of legal reasoning; 
secondly, it relates the arbitral performance to a particular ‘legitimate expectation’ 
concerning that very arbitral performance as the cause for a legitimate arbitral award.  
The two interwoven perspectives played out here are those of arbitration as a form of 
contract-based dispute mechanism, on the one hand, and of arbitration as a form of 
                                                 
37   Stephan W. Schill, ‘Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and 
Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach’ (2011) 52 (1) Virginia J Intl L 57, 66. 
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adjudication, on the other. As regards its legitimating self-understanding, it is clear that 
contract-based arbitration does not derive its authority from consent (or emerge on the basis 
of contract, agreement or treaty) but must rather be understood as being effectively 
authorised by consent. Rather than perceiving investment treaty arbitration as a form of 
adjudication in which arbitral activity is regarded as performing a function of delegated 
authority in deciding on matters of public importance, contract-based perspectives on 
arbitration highlight the autonomous nature of tribunals once they are effectively authorised. 
Analysing the degree of self-imposed restriction on a tribunal’s procedural autonomy, 
Giuditta Cordero Moss has noted that, primarily, ‘[the only limitation that the tribunal seems 
to have is … contained in the arbitration agreement’.38 
However, a perspective on arbitration as a form of adjudication does not deny arbitrators their 
autonomy but rather favours an expansion of the scope of interpretation. This is because 
proponents of such a view look upon ISDS as intrinsic to and a driving factor of global 
administrative law39 or global governance in general.40 Referring to the particular role of 
legitimate expectation towards arbitral authority, Schill and Kingsbury have pointed out that 
‘[t]he effects of public decisions of investment tribunals are not limited to the investment 
treaty governing the dispute at hand.’41 As for arbitral tribunals, Schill and Kingsbury 
emphasise that they serve ‘as review agencies to assess balances governments have struck 
between investor interests and public interests’.42 
When reading these remarks alongside the Moss quotation above, two observations seem of 
particular relevance in the context of the current analysis. Firstly, all three authors, in firmly 
stating their position on the role that arbitrators should perform, refer to at least some 
limitations of treaty law that affect a tribunal’s interpretative scope. Both Moss’ as well as 
Schill and Kingsbury’s views thus acknowledge the reciprocal relation between authority and 
authorisation. The second observation is inherently related to this reciprocity of 
understandings. For relating the distinction between contract based and delegated authority to 
                                                 
38   Giuditta Cordero Moss, ‘Tribunal’s Powers versus Party Autonomy’ in Peter Muchlinski, Federico 
Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) 
1207. 
39   Gus van Harten and Martin Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law’ (2006) 17 (1) Eur J Intl L 121, and Gus van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and 
Public Law (OUP 2007). 
40   Compare with Schill and Kingsbury (n 9) 50. 
41   Ibid 41. 
42   Schill and Kingsbury (n 9) 50. 
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the literature on the proceedings of appointment of arbitrators43 reveals that the conflict 
between internal and external sources of legitimation in investment treaty arbitration is not so 
much a conflict between internal and external recognition but rather touches upon the 
problem of procedural representation of disputants’ interests itself.  
Holding this tension, it is highly instructive to turn to Daniel Markovits’ writings on the 
argumentative structure of enthusiasts and critics of arbitral institutions, as he found that both 
shared two common assumptions of the idea of arbitration. The first of these, he writes, is 
that ‘arbitration is seen as ‘a contractually created substitute for adjudication [with the 
commonly supposed idea] that adjudication pursues the true and just resolution of disputes, 
whereas contract merely reflects the balance of advantage that is revealed through bargaining 
among competitors.’44 On the basis of these two interconnected assumptions, Markovits sees 
a tendency in arbitration enthusiasts ‘[to] exploit the analogy to adjudication in order to 
construct an expansive account of arbitral authority – so that an arbitrator’s authority might 
extend well beyond the range of freedom of contract, for example, to deciding statutory 
claims and even (when courts affirm the arbitrability of arbitrability) to determining its own 
scope.’45 Arbitration critics, on the other hand, Markovits argues, ‘exploit the analogy to 
contract which enables them to restrict an arbitrator’s authority according to the narrow 
limits of contractual authority, so that, for example, it cannot extend to claims involving 
statutory rights in which the [S]tate has an interest that stands apart from the parties.’46 
Markovits thus exposes not merely rhetorical divergences between enthusiasts and critics of 
arbitration but also reveals the common beliefs and presuppositions underlying the arbitral 
institution. These suggest that arbitral authority, due to its contractual and adjudicatory 
moments, is determined by its social function, that is to say, the particular institutional 
expectations associated with it. Markovits concludes that ‘The legal space occupied by 
arbitration is spanned, as it were, by contract and adjudication’.47  
                                                 
43   See especially the writings of Jan Paulsson in which he continuously argues for institutional and moral 
reasons ‘to abandon the practice of unilateral appointments’ (Paulsson (n 27) 348). Compare also with 
Paulsson (n 3) 276-281. 
44   Daniel Markovits, ‘Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of Adjudication and 
Contract’ (2009–2010) 59 DePaul LR 431, 431–2. 
45   Ibid 434. 
46   Ibid. 
47   Ibid 433. 
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With respect to investment treaty arbitration and against the suggested ethics perspective on 
the matter, it thus becomes clear that internal and external legitimate expectations48 of arbitral 
performance fall into one. If arbitration enthusiasts and critics merely differ in their 
interpretative exploitation of one feature of arbitration while agreeing on the structural 
premises, the difference between contract-based and adjudication-oriented arbitration appears 
superficial. Following Markovits and translating his findings into international investment 
terms, legitimacy is not linked with the causal relation between arbitral performance and 
arbitral award but rather depends on the coherence of expectation between arbitration as 
arbitral performance (internal) and arbitration as adjudicatory dispute mechanism (external). 
Furthermore, to isolate the contractual moment in investment treaty arbitration from the 
adjudicatory moment means to accentuate the limited scope of treaty authorisation 
(contractual) against tribunal’s interpretative authority over inter-State treaty provision 
(jurisdictional).  
For Julio César Betancourt, for example, it is ‘something of a misnomer [...] to refer to the 
primarily contractual duty of an international arbitral tribunal as a genuinely jurisdictional 
function’.49 This is because arbitral awards are ‘nothing more than a further manifestation of 
not only the parties’ freedom of contract but also […] the courts’ reliance on arbitration as a 
means of dispute settlement’.50 In this view, the merely delegated – if not derivative – 
authority of arbitral tribunals seems to underpin the basic insight that there is no 
interpretative authority without authorisation. In an effort to isolate contractual from 
jurisdictional authority and distinguishing between jurisdiction and decision-making power, 
Betancourt is nevertheless compelled to acknowledge that tribunals are not only authorised 
but also endowed with self-sustained authority.51 In denying arbitral tribunals’ jurisdictional 
authority whilst also affirming their arbitral autonomy over procedural issues, Betancourt’s 
retreat to arbitrators’ ‘decision-making powers’ is thus exemplary for the commonality in 
theorists’ conceptual pre-assumptions, as highlighted by Markovits.  
                                                 
48   Internal and external legitimate expectations are also referred to as ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ 
legitimate expectations. Compare with e.g. Giorgio Sacerdoti, ‘The application of BITs in time of economic 
crisis’ in Giorgio Sacerdoti, Pia Acconci, Mara Valenti and Anna de Luca (eds.), General Interests of Host 
States in International Investment Law (CUP 2014) 3, 21.  
49   Julio César Betancourt, ‘Understanding the ‘Authority’ of International Tribunals: A Reply to 
Professor Jan Paulsson’ (2013) 4 (2) J Intl Dispute Settlement, 227, 231. 
50   Ibid 234/235. 
51   Ibid 235/236. 
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It has been suggested during the course of this examination that arbitral autonomy and 
arbitral recognition are, in fact, interdependent. The conceptual force which made the 
inclusion of a ‘decision-making power’ in Betancourt’s account necessary verifies that an 
inversion of the above observation also holds true: There is no authorisation without 
interpretative authority. In other words, if treaty authorisation only contains a moment of 
delegation of power52 while lacking a ‘past-perfect’ moment of ‘having established 
authority’, tribunals could be regarded as not having decision-making powers at all, let alone 
interpretative authority. The correlation between internal and external power, and internal and 
external legitimate expectations, simply denies the isolation and fixation of the institution of 
arbitration. The concept of ‘authority’ and the concept of ‘authorisation’ contain transcending 
moments of their own negation in the sense that recognised authority is the product of 
authorisation, and successful authorisation resides in recognised authority. At the same time, 
authority and authorisation are conceptually intertwined in that recognised authority 
embodies the ‘past perfect’ of authorisation while authorisation represents the persistent 
conditio sine qua non of authority.  
Against the background of the reciprocal dynamic between authority and authorisation, it 
becomes clear why scholars engaged with the question of arbitral legitimacy usually lean 
towards one interpretation of the nature of arbitration while refraining from identifying that 
interpretation as exclusive. Caron, for example, notes that any ‘discussion of coherency in the 
ICSID [framework] must begin by noting that the root of the problem is embedded very 
deeply in the structure of arbitration itself.’53 He continues by comparing this framework to 
the one provided by municipal contract law in which the actions of a variety of actors are 
framed with the highest possible inclusion of the interests of participants for the price of 
coherence.54 His view on the necessity for a minimum of external constraints put on 
investment treaty arbitration can be compared to Brower and Schill’s stance, who also stress 
that ‘arbitrators in investment-treaty disputes are required to reach their decisions based on 
their impartial and independent judgments’.55 However, they remark that it is precisely for 
this form of independent arbitral performance that ‘investment-treaty arbitration has little in 
common with private-law arbitration where the parties have full sovereignty in determining 
                                                 
52   See for a strong proponent of arbitral authority as a mandate Böckstiegel (n 1) 1868. 
53   Caron (n 7) 516. 
54   Ibid. 
55   Brower and Schill (n 2) 492. 
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not only which law arbitrators have to apply, but also whether they should render an impartial 
and independent decision at all.’56 
This is because ‘investment-treaty arbitration in its decision making process is [essentially] 
an adjudicatory process’.57 Brower and Schill thus conclude that ISDS ‘is in fact not classic 
arbitration where the parties have full liberty to set the standards for the decision-making 
process and can control the way the dispute is resolved.’58 
The emphasis put on arbitration’s autonomy while perpetually relating this to the final cause 
of investment treaty arbitration, i.e. the decision over State action or administrative measures, 
perfectly illustrates the dialectical tension between the non-contextuality and contextual 
embeddedness of arbitral awards. Illustrating this unique, oscillating structure of investor-
State arbitration, Kotuby and Sobota see arbitrators ‘in a position of privilege’ at the same 
time as facing ‘a delicate task’ in ‘pronounc[ing] judgment on official government acts and 
award damages that could significantly affect the public fisc’.59 Consequently, they conclude, 
the privileged position arbitrators find themselves in ‘must be exercised with care’60 because 
it per se establishes a ‘heightened responsibility’.61  
This essentially ethical stand on coherence and legitimacy of investor-State arbitration 
manifests itself in the literature in varying contexts. This section has developed a fuller notion 
of legitimacy as the embodiment of a coherence of expectations between arbitration as 
arbitral performance (internal authority) and arbitration as adjudicatory dispute mechanism 
(external authority). Thus legitimacy concerns are essentially not an unease over arbitral 
performance alone, understood as sufficient ground for legitimate awards, but must also be 
seen to relate to an assessment of arbitral performance in its systemic role in a legal field in 
which private and public interests and preferences collide. Two questions necessarily raised 
by the call for a ‘heightened responsibility’ can thus be identified and will be addressed in the 
following: Firstly, to whom or what does the institution of arbitration have a responsibility to 
reconcile internal and external legitimate expectation, if scholars deny binding advocacy in 
arbitral proceedings (responsibility)? Secondly, if legitimate expectations are constitutive in 
                                                 
56   Ibid. 
57   Ibid. 
58   Ibid. 
59   Kotuby and Sobota (n 11) 455. 
60   Ibid. 
61   Wälde (n 10) 41, emphasis added. 
 17 
 
internal and external moments of ISDS, what particular legal function does investment treaty 
arbitration serve (accountability)?  
VI. Responsibility And Accountability 
The scholarly legitimacy concerns which this article categorises as relating to the 
‘responsibility’ and ‘accountability’ of investment tribunals are mutually intertwined and 
based upon the conceptual tensions between arbitral autonomy and award recognition. 
Responsibility denotes the internal ethical stand (responsiveness) arbitrators take towards 
their activity as one oscillating between private and public dispute settlement conceptions. 
Accountability, on the other hand, signifies the distinct process of how the issued arbitral 
award ‘performs’ within a framework of already established public and private expectations. 
Responsibility in the literature frames legitimacy concerns according to the dual nature of 
arbitration while relying on the seemingly causal relation between coherent arbitral conduct 
and coherent awards which was refuted above.62 But even when contrasting the critical role 
of arbitration in interpreting and determining treaty standards with its ambiguous nature of 
being systemically rooted in both commercial arbitration and forms of public adjudication, 
the referential horizon of scholarly concerns relates, as Caron puts it, to the ‘consequence[s] 
of the public importance of the issues possibly addressed by the arbitration’.63 Even though 
this consequentialist emphasis differs sharply from the moment of non-consequentialism 
which was revealed above as being partly inherent in arbitral autonomy, it also exemplarily 
embodies the dialectical dynamic of arbitral autonomy according to internal and external 
legitimate expectations. Indeed, a disconnection between arbitral autonomy and its 
consequences, including expectations prior to and during arbitral proceedings, represents an 
insulation of arbitral awards from their external moment altogether. In what may be read as 
support for this analysis, Franck remarks that ‘greater sensitivity to the public interest’ equals 
a minimising of ‘the risk of inconsistent decisions’.64 A lack of responsiveness to issues of a 
potential public nature, on the other hand, may result in public pressure threatening the 
interpretative authority of tribunals.65 
Moreover, the link to external expectations connects arbitral responsibility with the moment 
of accountability. The latter stands for a democratic aspect of participation, something which 
                                                 
62   See Schill and Kingsbury (n 9) 41, also Brower II (n 15) 66. 
63   Caron (n 7) 514. Compare also with Sornarajah (n 13) 360/361. 
64   Franck (n 20) 1625. 
65   Ibid. 
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some scholars conceive as elementary to arbitration.66 In an abstract form that does not 
unnecessarily favour a particular political sentiment about the degree of participatory rights 
as constituted, for example, in democratic societies,67 accountability demarcates the interests 
of the party to the dispute that had also given consent to the authorisation of the tribunal. 
Brower and Schill describe this approach to ISDS as follows: 
Critics argue that arbitration, as compared to dispute resolution in courts, is unsuitable 
for ... public law disputes because arbitrators are privately contracted by the parties to 
specific disputes and do not hold, like tenured judges, a public office. For this reason, 
arbitration is said to institutionalize a pro-investor bias because arbitrators are 
influenced by their self-interest in being reappointed in future cases.68 
While this critique is formulated as if the central issue was the composition of the tribunals,69 
the fundamental stumbling block is, in fact, the relation between investment treaty arbitration 
and public concerns. Charles H. Brower II has noted that it is not arbitral autonomy as such 
which is seen as a threat to legitimacy but rather the disconnection between the tribunal’s 
‘creative lawmaking’ and its ‘unpedigreed outcomes’.70 The latter are isolated from the 
public realm and thus seem illegitimate to the community affected because such insulated 
arbitral practice does not, as Brower II continues, ‘conform to historical practice, and 
incorporate fundamental values shared by the governed community’.71 
The interdependent relation underlying responsibility and accountability concerns of 
investment treaty arbitration is embedded in the dialectics of authorisation and authority in 
the following way: Concerns of arbitral responsibility are scholars’ concerns over or (arbitral 
autonomy’s) concerns from the perspective of an established ‘authority’. Concerns of arbitral 
accountability are essentially scholars’ concerns over or (public) concerns from the 
perspective of ‘authorisation’. It is proposed that the term mediating the two perspectives is 
representation, because it relates two expectations which represent intrinsic signifiers to one 
another. 
                                                 
66   Caron (n 35) 561. Compare also with Sornarajah (n 13) 360/361 and Franck (n 20) 1584. 
67   It is noteworthy that the external accountability of investor-State tribunals is instantly associated with 
democratic legitimacy. The argument given usually asserts that democratic societies are simply accustomed 
to a form of legitimacy and legitimate authority that arises out of and is measured against the degree of 
democratic participation. Compare with Schill and Kingsbury (n 9) 41, Schill (n 37) 67. 
68   Brower and Schill (n 2) 489. 
69   Compare also with Franck (n 20) 1585. 
70   Brower II (n 15) 66. 
71   Ibid 51. 
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VII. Representation And Perceptions Of Legitimacy 
It has been submitted above that the conflict between internal and external sources of 
legitimacy in investment treaty arbitration  touches upon the problem of the representation of 
disputants’ interests itself. The problem emerges from a distinct social function ascribed to 
arbitration and, as a consequence, from conflicting institutional expectations associated with 
it. Hence the mediation of internal and external legitimate expectation is understood to 
approximate a desired coherence of internal and external moments of arbitral performance, 
leading eventually to a perception of legitimacy. With regard to the marked democratic 
inclinations of a majority of scholars, ‘unrepresentative tribunals’72 pose a problem in their 
own right. If contextualised as a matter of participation of the initial and affected parties to 
the dispute, it becomes evident that a more inclusive engagement might soften the concerns 
of a democratically habituated community.73 However, a participatory broadening of the 
arbitral process is not without detriments, as expanding participatory elements also expose 
investor-State arbitration to an increased influence of political interests. This collides with 
one of the central ideas behind the private and excluding nature of arbitration, which was the 
depoliticisation of investment disputes.74 The apparent dilemma of reconciling internal and 
external expectations, if portrayed on a conceptual level, also imparts an ideal by which ISDS 
appears to be measured and of which it falls short. This ideal is exposed ex negativo in that 
investment treaty arbitration denies the conclusive reconciliation of these two expectations. 
It has been suggested by Schill and others that at the heart of the criticism of international 
investment law is a ‘public law challenge’,75 denoting the review of policy measures by non-
political and non-politically legitimated arbitrators. This stance is rooted in an ideal of 
arbitration as not the advocacy of particular interests but of notions concerning public values 
that the affected political community holds dear. Legitimate expectations, when associated 
with more general notions of legitimacy, do not take the shape of participatory interests but 
rather manifest as perceptions of the form of arbitral performance. In the literature, 
predictability and reliability are therefore related to ‘perceptions of legitimacy’. Franck, for 
example, sees the ‘consistency of interpretation and application of rules’ as instrumental in 
promoting ‘perceptions of fairness and justice’, which strongly links to jurisprudential 
                                                 
72   Ibid 66. 
73   See e.g. Samantha Besson, ‘Theorizing the Sources of International Law’ in Samantha Besson and 
John Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (OUP 2009) 163, 176. 
74   See e.g. Brower II (n 15) 65. 
75   Schill (n 37) 67. 
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coherence as a ‘key element of legitimacy’.76 Furthermore, Brower II affirms ‘that 
international legal regimes depend for their survival on perceptions of legitimacy’, and also 
emphasises that ‘[t]o generate perceptions of legitimacy, legal regimes must operate 
predictably’.77  
The notion that legitimacy concerns are subject to a dialectical dynamic means that these 
concerns culminate in an idealisation of the representational form investor-State arbitration 
should take in order to be perceived as legitimate. That the crisis of the legitimacy of arbitral 
authority is not a crisis concerning actual arbitral reasoning, nor actual interpretations or 
awards was demonstrated in the analytical development of the concept of interpretative 
authority as simultaneously adhering to internal and external perceptions of coherent conduct. 
Moreover, the ethical stand on legitimacy concerns regarding interpretative authority of 
arbitral bodies has proven fruitful in the conceptualisation of a mediated formal standard of 
arbitral performance. In his analysis of the self-referential mechanisms that an international 
institution adheres to in order to establish or confirm external perceptions of authority and 
legitimacy, Caron has affirmatively pointed out that the ‘perception of illegitimacy may 
spring as easily from not acting as from acting’ 78.  
In summary, critical scholarly references to perceptions of legitimacy are essentially 
references to perceptions of coherence of arbitral performance in its internal (procedural) and 
external (award-related) aspects. While the core institutional purpose of generating coherence 
and responsiveness to a general adjudicative system is strongly linked to legitimacy itself,79 
the arbitral representation of a coherent international system of rules on foreign investment 
forms the measure in the literature concerned with legitimacy against which problematic 
conditions of arbitral performance are evaluated.  
VIII. Conclusion: Legitimacy And The Crisis Of Arbitral Reasoning  
Paying tribute to the etymological root of the term, the ‘crisis’ internal to the representation 
of the treaty system signifies a separation of two correlative moments. Investor-State 
arbitration, as representing a coherent legal system, is perceived to oscillate between 
contractual (private) and treaty-based (public) traits. This distinction translates into two 
perspectives on arbitral performance. Firstly, ISDS responds to internal legitimate 
                                                 
76   Franck (n 20) 1585, emphasis added. 
77   Brower II (n 15) 51. 
78   Caron (n 35) 560/561. 
79   Caron (n 7) 518. 
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expectations and secondly, investment treaty arbitration attempts to address external 
legitimate expectations. These perspectives on arbitration either stress the autonomous nature 
of arbitration or the arbitral responsibility to represent the moment of ‘public concern’ 
within public treaty law. Therefore, the two distinct attitudes anticipate two distinct but, in 
the unity of internal and external moments, related representations of legitimacy. First, 
complying with the idea of arbitration as a private dispute settlement mechanism, some 
arbitrators, Schreuer has remarked, ‘see it as their duty to decide the particular case without 
regard to a jurisprudence constante’ while, second, ‘[o]thers see it as their duty to contribute 
to the development of a coherent body of law’.80 To decide either regardless of or with regard 
to the formation of consistent jurisprudential referents81 was demonstrated above to be pivotal 
to the generation of predictability and reliability and to form, in turn, the basis of perceptions 
of legitimacy.  
Yet generating a perception of investment treaty proceedings as being performed ‘without 
regard to external expectations’ does not indicate arbitrariness in arbitral conduct. On the 
contrary, this ideal-type82 of autonomous arbitral performance rigorously follows the (self-
given) procedural template agreed upon and found to be appropriate prior to the tribunal’s 
commencement of proceedings. In this sense, the internal perception of investment treaty 
arbitration as an autonomous mechanism of dispute resolution is formal because the 
exclusively procedural formality guarantees perceptions of legitimacy within a process that is 
autopoietic and self-referential with regard to the ordering procedural setting.83  
In this framework of rigorous arbitral autonomy, the form of the arbitral performance is 
critical in generating legitimacy. Being originally designed for and applied to disputes of a 
commercial nature, the very form of arbitration, of the arbitral rules that require meticulous 
observance from all parties to the dispute, and of the ethical stand arbitrators take towards the 
nature of arbitral performance, may be seen to imprint itself onto the outcome of the dispute 
unfavourably to the public authority involved, that is to the respondent State.84 
                                                 
80   Schreuer (n 2) 802. 
81   See also Brower and Schill (n 2) 474. 
82   See also Loukas A. Mistelis, ‘Award as an Investment: The Value of an Arbitral Award or the Cost of 
Non–Enforcement’ (2013) 28 (1) ICSID R – Foreign Investment L J 64, 69. 
83   Compare also with Jan Paulsson’s vision of the ideal of arbitration. He writes: “‘Arbitration is a form 
of self-governance”’ (Paulsson (n 3) 259) with which he too points towards the self-referential and auto-
legislative constitutive elements intrinsic to arbitration.  
84   Cp. with Tania Voon, Andrew Mitchell and James Munro, ‘Parting Ways: The Impact of Mutual 
Termination of Investment Treaties on Investor Rights’ (2014) 29 (2) ICSID R – Foreign Investment L 
J, 451, 473. 
 22 
 
Perceiving arbitration as instrumental rather than rigorously autonomous means, on the other 
hand, to firstly regard arbitration not under the heading of a depoliticised dispute settlement 
mechanism that ensures an ‘equality of arms’ between both parties85 but to rather take the 
initial and constant public purpose of investment protection seriously into account. The 
public interest in arbitration is ‘initial’ because States as representatives of public interest 
authorise this dispute settlement through international treaty provisions while also expressing 
public interest in the protection of foreign direct investments. The ‘constant’ public interest 
inherent to investor-State arbitration, furthermore, naturally arises out of the participation of 
State sovereignties during proceedings as respondents who represent the interest of the 
political community affected and who, within the framework of the New York Convention, 
warrant the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. Hence, if, as Paulsson suggests, 
the ‘idea of arbitration is liberty’,86 understood as rigorous autonomy, the ideal-type of the 
contextual aspect of arbitration essentially negates self-reference, formalistic autonomy and 
operational exclusion of external content. The contextual side of investment treaty arbitration 
displays a veritable connection to the community involved, through both the recognition and 
the enforcement of awards. In this way, investor-State arbitration’s contextual moment 
transcends the formal procedural aspects, overcomes the isolation of focusing solely on 
settling the dispute at hand regardless of the impact an award might have, and thus becomes 
instrumental.  
For the contextual side of arbitration, being instrumental means that it has its quintessence 
outside of itself because content-dependence indicates that the procedural performance is 
there to answer or to fulfil external contextual requirements. Unlike the formalistic content-
independent side which generates perceptions of legitimacy in performing arbitration purely 
self-sufficiently, the instrumental element of ISDS is a procedural anticipation of external 
legitimate expectations and public authority itself. Capturing eloquently the spirit of this 
moment of contextual embeddedness, which is particularly pivotal to investment treaty 
arbitration, Paulsson has described the idea of an instrumental kernel within arbitration as the 
‘great paradox of arbitration [which] seeks the cooperation of the very public authorities from 
which it wants to free itself.’87 
                                                 
85   Van Harten and Loughlin (n 39) 149. 
86   Paulsson (n 3) 256. 
87   Jan Paulsson, ‘Arbitration in Three Dimensions’ (2010) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers, 2. 
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The external legitimate expectation projected onto the arbitral performance, the ‘scope of 
legal protection granted to investors’, as Anna de Luca has put it, is thus strictly correlative 
with the community affected and their evaluations of ‘what is deemed to deserve legal 
protection’.88 However, this link between external perceptions of legitimacy and the resultant 
standards of public interest projected onto arbitral conduct produces a similar concern 
regarding the neutrality and suitability of the dispute mechanism installed. If the private 
format of arbitral procedural rules imprints itself onto the award in an investor-biased or 
State-favouring manner, arbitration as an instrument anticipating public interest and 
reflecting State power89 seems to be as much influenced by content-determination as by 
formal rules.  
Both moments of investment arbitration are inherent in the instrumental as well as the 
autonomous nature of investor-State arbitration, and both are legitimating factors in that they 
determine standards of arbitral performance which meet external or internal legitimate 
expectations. Yet both, based on indeterminate notions of ‘public interest’90 and ‘autonomy’, 
only signify abstract place holders in a dialectical concept of legitimacy, incorporating 
external as well as internal legitimate expectations. 
Accordingly and based on the findings of this analysis, a crisis of legitimate interpretative 
authority stems from a perspective which interprets the above-developed different 
perspectives on investment treaty arbitration as standing in an oppositional or dichotomous 
relation. Instead of being appreciated as conceptually interdependent, investment treaty 
arbitration is perceived to be bound either by internal and external expectations, compelled to 
formal and contextual determinants, autonomous and instrumental procedural objectives, or, 
as the most popular narrative tells it, torn between private and public interests. Performatively 
transforming oppositional perceptions into differentiating perspectives is thus the first and 
foremost source of arbitral authority and legitimacy, and relates hortatively to the ‘arbitrating 
arbitrator’ as well as the ‘arbitrator performing arbitration.’ 
                                                 
88   Anna de Luca, ‘Indirect expropriations and regulatory takings’ in Giorgio Sacerdoti, Pia Acconci, Mara 
Valenti and Anna de Luca (eds.), General Interests of Host States in International Investment Law (CUP 
2014) 58, 73. 
89   See Caron (n 35) 588. 
90   See the famous 1824 case in the English Court of the Exchequer in which it was said that ‘public 
policy’ ‘is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you’ 
(Richardson vs. Melish [1824-34] ALL ER 258, para. 266). Also cited in Paulsson (n 3) 130. 
